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1. Introduction
Reliability, safety and durability represent important properties of modern aircraft, which is
necessary for its effective in-service use.
The reason of the main hazard for aircraft are both random and determined negative influ‐
ences rendering the controlled object during its use. Faults, failures, disturbances, noises, in‐
fluences of environment and control errors represent the objectively existing stream of
random negative influences on the object.
Statistically, in the recent years the majority of aircraft incidents are connected with the hu‐
man factor and late fault detection in plane systems. In this regard, requirements to flight
safety which demand development of new methods and algorithms of control-and-condi‐
tion monitoring/ diagnostic for complex objects raise every year. The analysis of modern gas
turbine engines has shown that most faults appears in the engine itself and its FADEC
(40-75% for FADEC, Figure 1).
The percentage of faults for FADEC depends on the achieved values for no-failure operation
indicators of the engine and FADEC.
During the development of FADEC, it is necessary to adhere to the principles and methods
guaranteeing safety and reliability of aircraft in use to guarantee proper responses in all
range of negative influences.
Full information on its work is necessary for complete control of a condition of the engine:
1. Reliable detection of a fault cause providing decision-making on a technical condition
of gas turbines;
© 2014 Kulikov et al.; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2. Reliable diagnosis and localization of faults and negative influences are necessary for
definition of technical condition of gas turbines for the purpose of providing a reconfi‐
guration and functioning of its subsystems [1, 2].
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Figure 1. Faults percentage for engines and FADEC
The hardware for condition monitoring of measurement channels in many cases allows to de‐
tect only catastrophic (breakage or short circuit) faults, i.e. their stochastic properties on time of
the process observed in one object and on a set of objects are not distinguishable [3]. The crite‐
ria of warning messages on faults appearance are based mainly on determined logic opera‐
tions and distinguish between only two conditions: "operational" (fully operational) or "fault".
In this chapter, hierarchical fuzzy Markov models for quantitative estimation of system safety
of gas turbines taking into account the monitoring of cause-effect relations are considered.
Transition from two-valued to fuzzy logic for estimation of degradation indexes and the analy‐
sis of fault developments for the gas turbine and its FADEC is considered for this purpose.
2. Hierarchical model of faults development processes in gas turbines
Complex diagnostics of the power plant is proposed to be carried out on elements and units,
using the hierarchy analysis method [4, 5]. First, decomposition into independent subsys‐
tems of various hierarchy levels is carried out on structural features. Similarly, the power
plant and its systems are represented in the form of hierarchy of elements and blocks.
This approach enables cause-effect relationships to be identified on the hierarchy structure
of a system.
In Figure 2, the hierarchical structure of states of the power-plant is shown. The power plant
is represented in the form of a hierarchical structure as the complex system consisting of
subsystems and elements (units) with built-in test/monitoring functions, according to the
distributed architecture. For this purpose, the power plant decomposition might be per‐
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formed into independent subsystems with various levels of hierarchy on structural and
functional features in the following way:
• Control and monitoring system (FADEC);
• Hydro mechanical system (actuators);
• Fuel system;
• Start-up system;
• Lubricant oil system;
• Drainage system, etc.
The hierarchy analysis allows to utilize the state model on the basis of faults development
which enables the system state to be estimated at each level of the hierarchy.
The mathematical model of states is represented as
S =  <G, F , L , R > ,
where S is state vector,
G is hierarchy of system faults,
F is quantitative estimate of faults,
L is set of fault influence indexes,
R is mutual influence system of faults.
The depth of hierarchy G is referred to as h, and h = 0 for the root element of G.
For G the following conditions are satisfied:
1. There is splitting of G into subsets of hk, k = 1 … n.
2. From x∈ L k  follows that x −⊂h k +1, k =1, …, n −1.
3. From x∈ L k  follows that x +⊂h k−1, k =2, …, n.
For every x∈G there is a weight function such as:
ωx : x −→ 0, 1 ; where ∑
y∈x −
ωx(y)=1.
The sets of hi are the hierarchy levels, and function ωx is a function of fault priority of one level
concerning the state of the power-plant x. Notice that if x −⊄h k +1 (for some level of hw), then ωx
can be defined for all hk, if it equals to zero for all faults in hk+1 which do not belong to x −.
The hierarchical FADEC model integrates:
• functional structure (block diagram);
• physical structure;
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Figure 2. Hierarchical state structure of power plant
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Fault levels Faults State Fault handlingpriority
Level 1
FADEC fault
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Fault of lane B
Levels 2-4
Fault of control function (B)
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n
Fault of control loop (B)
Levels 5-6
Integrated fault of
measurement for alternative
control law
Fault of actuator control circuit (B)
Level 7 Fault of lane A
Sh
ort
-te
rm
Level 8
Fault of control function (А)
Fault of control loop Fault of control loop (А)
Level 9
Integrated fault of
measurement (fault of same
measured parameters in
channels A)
Fault of actuator control circuit (А)
(fault of communication lines of
sensors or fault of FADEC hardware)
Level 10
Fault of measurement in
channel (break or short
circuit)
Long-term
Sensors Actuators
Table 1. Fragment of hierarchical classification of faults for FADEC
• tree states (state structure) of elements and units;
• tree of failures influence indexes.
On the hierarchical model, the system of faults interference R with logical operations of a
disjunction and a conjunction is applied. Such a system of faults interference allows to ana‐
lyze the state of all power-plant, both from the bottom up to the top, and from the top down
to the bottom and to carry out deeper analysis on various levels of decomposition of the
control system using an intermediate state: degradation.
The degradation is understood as "package/complex of degradationary changes of the sys‐
tem" and the degradationary change is "a separately considered irreversible change of a struc‐
ture of the system, worsening its properties, changing the parameters and characteristics".
Define the main faults of FADEC, the priorities of their elimination and the state they belong
to. In Table 1, an exemplary of a fragment of the hierarchical classification of faults for sen‐
sors and actuators of FADEC is presented.
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Fault levels 1 through 6 demand immediate handlings and correspond to the "catastrophic"
and "critical" states by FAA classification (Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Depart‐
ment of Transportation), given in [6]. The emerging of such states requires immediate land‐
ing of the aircraft. Fault levels 7 through 9 are classified as a "marginal" state and demand
operative handling after landing. In this case, it is possible to continue the flight, but post‐
flight repair on the ground is required. Faults at the 10th level demand their handling in
long-term prospect.
The degradation process for FADEC starts at the 10th level of hierarchy. From the 4th level
of hierarchy, the system starts to approach the system crash that can be regarded as «a criti‐
cal situation».
Note that development of such faults in certain cases can be detected in advance by estimat‐
ing the states of elements not only at the level of "0-1" (fully operational, operational/work‐
ing, fault), but also by considering their gradual degradation.
The state of an element or a system is proposed to be represented in the form of three pa‐
rameters { operational, degradation, fault }, see Tab. 2.
In the operational state S = 0, while during fault S = 1. The degradation degree range from
"0" to "1". Thus, the extreme values "0" and "1" are defined according to the determined log‐
ic, which is realized in the conventional FADEC (according to the design specifications for
the system). The introduction of this intermediate state of "degradation" expands the infor‐
mativity of the conventional condition monitoring algorithms.
Operational Degradation Fault
S = 0 0 < S < 1 S = 1
Table 2. Fuzzy representation of state
Based on the faults analysis and the hierarchy of states of the system at each level, the degree
of degradation of each item or sub-unit is determined (Figure 3). Fault states are classified via
degradation degree as "Negligible", "Marginal", "Critical" and "Catastrophic" [6]. The estima‐
tion of the degradation degree is defined on the membership function S which takes values in
the range ofS ∈ 0, 1 .If the degradation degree is closer to "1", the distance to a critical situa‐
tion will be closer. If the analysis of a system showed that the state vector is { 0,1 0,6 0,3 }, it is
possible to ensure that there is a "distance" before complete fault (a critical situation). As soon
as the system state will worsen with the appearance of new faults and will give the following
state vector { 0 0,3 0,7 }, then there will be a distance of 0,3 to a system crash. Thus the most in‐
formative indicator will be a tendency of faults appearance (trend), not the existence of degra‐
dation itself. Visual trend analysis provides an estimate of time before the critical situations
develop and, thus, for early planning of the crew actions [7, 8].
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Figure 3. Estimation of "degradation" state
Consider an example of correspondence of degradation degree and the operational state. At
the degradation degree of 0,25, the system is capable to carry out 75% of demanded func‐
tions (50% at 0,5 degradation, 25% at 0,75 and 0% at 1, which is the unavailable state). Such
scale allows to define a “threshold” state, below which further operation is not allowed for
safety reasons. Using the degradation degree, it is also possible to estimate the distance to a
critical situation and the speed of approximation to it (Figure 4).
t
Sh(x)
Catastrophic
Sta
tes
, time
Critical
Marginal
Negligible
Figure 4. Trend of state dynamics during flight
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Thus, the hierarchical model of fault developments allows to decompose the power-plant on
hierarchy levels for obtaining quantitative estimates of the degradation state and gradual
faults. The hierarchy analysis allows to utilize the state model and to estimate the system
state at each level of hierarchy. The state is represented in the form of a vector with parame‐
ters { operational, degradation, fault }. Depending on the degradation degree it is possible to
make an estimation of operability of object and system safety.
3. Fuzzy technique of determination of state parameters of gas turbine
and its systems
The built-in monitoring system (BMS) is a subsystem of monitoring, diagnosis and classifi‐
cation of faults of the gas turbine and its systems. The fault existence corresponds to a logic
state of "1", the absence does to a logic state of "0". Such state classification doesn't allow to
establish a "prefault" state, to trace faults’ development, and to define degradation of the
system and its elements. For more detailed analysis, the estimation of the intermediate state
of degradation is proposed. For this purpose, the use of fuzzy logic is considered. Signals
from sensors, and also logic state parameters from BMS will transform to linguistic variables
during fuzzification to a determined value arrives to the input of the fuzzifier. Let x is the
state parameter of an element (for example, the sensor). It is necessary to define fuzzy spaces
of input and output variables, and also terms for FADEC sensors. All signals from sensors
and actuators will transform into linguistic variables by fuzzification.
Consider an example of fuzzy representation of a state of the two-channel sensor of rotation‐
al speed of a high pressure turbocompressor rotor. For monitoring of operational condition
of communication lines of the FADEC sensor, a linguistic variable is introduced in the fol‐
lowing way:
Ω =  < xn, B = (xn), U , G, M > ,
where Ωn is the sensor state,
xn is the number of events when n is beyond the allowed limit band;
B is { operational, fault };
U is [0,4]
G is the syntactic rule generating terms of set B,
M is the semantic rule, which to each linguistic value x associate with its sense of
M(xn), and M(xn) designates a fuzzy subset of the carrier U.
Say that the sensor is considered failed after the fourth appearance of the shaft speed meas‐
urement beyond the allowed boundary, therefore the membership function is formed as
shown in Figure 5.
At a single appearance out of limit (xn = 1), membership function B1 takes the value 0,7, and
B2 = 0,3. The degradation degree takes the value of membership function B2. If the repeated
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breaking the limit doesn't prove to be true during the set period of time, the monitoring al‐
gorithm cancels the measurement: B1 = 1, B2 = 0.
1
0 4 xn
Operational (B1) Fault (B2)
1 2 3
μB(xn)
0,7
0,3
Figure 5. Membership functions of "sensor state"
In Figure 5 two membership functions are shown: state B1 corresponds to the function μB1
(xn), B2 is described by the function μB2 (xn).
The way of creating fuzzy rules is presented in Figure 6. This rule base is represented by the
table, which is filled in with fuzzy rules as follows [9]:
R (1) : IF (xn = A1 AND xn = B1) THEN y = T1
μ
μ
  
x1 
A1 
   
1
2
3
1
1
1
( ) 0,1
( ) 0,8
( ) 0,1
T
T
T
n
n
n



     
 
A2 
1
2
3
1
1
1
( ) 0,2
( ) 0,7
( ) 0,1
T
T
T
n
n
n



     
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  A1 A2 B1 B2 
 
 
 
x2 
Figure 6. Example of fuzzy rule base
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The values μT1, μT2, μT3 are set in the cell at the row “Operational" (A1) and the column
"Fault" (B2).
Consider a fragment of the rule base for estimates of the sensor state of the low pressure
shaft speed. Formulate the first rule: if the 1st coil (n11) of the sensor is operational (A1) and
the 2nd coil (n12) of the sensor is operational (A1), then the sensor is in the operational condi‐
tion with the following membership functions:
μoperational(n1)=1; μdegradation(n1)=0; μfault(n1)=0 .
Write down this rule as follows:
R (1) : IF (n11 = A1 AND n12 = A1) THEN y =T1 ⇒
μT 1(n1)=1; μT 2(n1)=0; μT 3(n1)=0 .
Other rules are created in the similar way.
Given a greater number of possible conditions (for example, greater number of the duplicat‐
ed coils of the sensor), one can develop a discrete-ordered scale of state parameters (Figure 7).
For further analysis of the system, enter the faults influence indexes at each level of hierar‐
chy, using a method of pairwise comparison as it is carried out in the hierarchy analysis
method.
Quantitative judgements on the importance of faults are performed for each pair of faults
(Fi, Fj) and these are represented by matrix A of the n×n size.
A= (aij),  (i, j =  1, 2, 3).
where aij is the relative importance of fault Fi in regard to Fj. The value Aij defines the impor‐
tance (respective values) Fi of faults in comparison with Fj.
Elements aij are defined by the following rules:
1. If aij =α, aji = 1/α, α≠ 0.
2. If fault Fi has identical relative importance with Fj, then aij =1, aji=1, in particular aii=1 for
all i.
Thus, a back-symmetric matrix A is obtained:
12 1
12 2
1 2
1
1 / 1 .
1 / 1 / 1
n
n
n n
a a
a aA
a a
é ùê úê ú= ê úê úê úë û
L
L
L L L L
L
(ID2)
After the representation of quantitative judgements about the fault pairs (Fi, Fj) in a numeri‐
cal expression with the numbers aij, the problem is reduced to that n possible faults F1, F2, …,
Fn will receive a corresponding set of numerical weights ω1, ω2, …, ωn, which would reflect
the fixed judgements about the condition of the gas turbine subsystem.
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Figure 7. Continuous (a) and discrete (b) scale of degradation
If the expert judgement is absolute at all comparisons for all i, j, k, then matrix A is called
consistent.
If the diagonal of matrix A consists of units (aij = 1) and A is the consistent matrix, then at
small changes in aij the greatest eigenvalue λmax is close to n, and the other eigenvalue are
close to zero.
Based on the matrix of pair comparison values of faults A, the vector of priorities for fault
classification is obtained, along with vector ω satisfying the criterion:
Aω =λmaxω,
where ω is the eigenvector of matrix A and λmax is the maximum eigenvalue, which is close
to the matrix order n.
As it is desirable to have the normalized solution, let’s slightly change ω, considering
α =∑
i=1
n ωi and replacing ω with (1/α) ω. This provides uniqueness, and also that∑i=1
n ωi =1.
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A=
F1
F2
⋮
Fn
ω1 / ω1 ω1 / ω2 ⋯ ω1 / ωn
ω2 / ω1 ω2 / ω2 ⋯ ω2 / ωn
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
ωn / ω1 ωn / ω2 ⋯ ωn / ωn
F1 F2 ⋯ Fn
ω1
ω2
⋮
ωn
=λmax
ω1
ω2
⋮
ωn
.
Note that small changes in aij cause small change in λmax, then the deviation of the latter from
n is a coordination measure. It allows estimating proximity of the obtained scale to the basic
scale of relations. Hence, the coordination index
(λmax−n) / (n −1)
is considered to be an indicator of "proximity to coordination". Generally, if this number is
not greater than 0.1 then it is possible to be satisfied with the judgements about the faults
importance.
At each level hi of the hierarchy for n elements of the gas turbine and its subsystems, the
state vector {operational, degradation, fault} is determined, taking into account the influence
coefficients of failures:
Sh i(xn)=μh i(xn)⋅ωi,
whereμh i(xn) is the membership function value of the element xn (degradation degree). To
determine the element/unit state of the hierarchy at a higher level Sh i(xn) for the input states
of low-level Sh i−1(xn) one stage of defuzzification is performed.
The output value Sh i(xn) is presented in the form of the determined vector of state with pa‐
rameters { operational, degradation, fault }.
The state estimation begins with the bottom level of hierarchy. The description of a state set
obtained by means of fuzzification and deffuzification with the use of the logic operations of
disjunction ∨  (summing), and conjunction ∧  (multiplication), which are designated as fol‐
lows:
logic operation "AND"
logic operation "OR"
In performing operation "AND" in the inference system of fuzzy logic, the terminal tops are
summed in order to determine the general state at one level of hierarchy that is presented as
follows:
XΣ = x1∨ x2∨ … ∨ xn
In performing operation "OR", the "worst" state vector is chosen, with the maximum param‐
eters of degradation μdegradation(x) or faults μfault(x). The selector of maximum chooses from the
fault influence indexes the one that has the maximum value.
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The use of the hierarchical representation allows a small amount of "short" fuzzy rules to
adequately describe multidimensional dependencies between inputs and outputs.
4. Fuzzy hierarchical Markov state models
A promising approach to constructing intelligent systems of control, diagnosis and monitor‐
ing could be the stochastic modelling on the basis of Markov chains combined with the for‐
malized hierarchy theory.
Within a fuzzy hierarchical model, consider fault development processes with the use of
Markov chains. Such dynamic models allow to investigate the change of elements’ states in
time. Fault development can include not only single faults and their combinations, but also
sequences (chains) of so-called "consecutive" faults [10, 11].
During FADEC analysis, classification, formalization and representation of processes of con‐
dition monitoring and fault diagnosis for the main subsystems of gas turbines (control, mon‐
itoring, fuel supply etc.) is carried out. These processes are represented in the form of
Markov chains which allow to analyze the state dynamics of the power-plant.
The transition probability matrix of a Markov chain for modeling faults and their conse‐
quences, has a universal structure for all levels of system decomposition (Figure 8):
• system as a whole (power plant);
• constructon units;
• elements.
Single faults Faults hierarchy
Elements
Units
Power-plant
Figure 8. Hierarchical structure of Markov model of fault
The hierarchical Markov model is built in the generalized state space where physical param‐
eters and binary fault flags are used for the estimation of a state vector of the element, unit
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and power-plant. The state vector includes three parameters { operational, degradation,
fault } which allow to track the fault development and degradation process of the system.
During FADEC diagnosis, the area of single faults is mostly considered. The proposed Mar‐
kov model enables to present the system with multiple faults and their sequences. The top
state level of a system reflects in the aggregated form the information on faults at the lower
state levels.
The elements’ state at the levels of the hierarchy depends on the previous values of state pa‐
rameters of the elements, values of membership functions and fault influence indexes.
For the estimation of transition probabilities between the states of a Markov chain, it is re‐
quired to calculate relative frequencies of events such as Si →Sj for a given interval of time. In
particular, at the top level, the number of events during one flight (Figure 9) can be of interest.
1 2 3
1. Operational 
state
2. Degradation
3. Fault leading to  
engine stop
P11
P21
P31
P12
P22
P32
P13
P23
P33
Engine restart in 
flight
Prob{ }ij i jP S S= 
Figure 9. Transition probability matrix of power-plant during one flight
The most important events during flight are the emergency turning off of the engine stop
(shutdown) and the possibility of its restart. For the probability estimation of such events, it
is required to use statistics on all park of the same type engines. For realization of such esti‐
mation methods, it is required that flights information was available on each plane and
power-plant. Such information should be gathered and stored in a uniform format and
should be available for processing. Modern information technologies open possibilities for
such research. To analyze fault development processes of one FADEC, it is possible to use
results of the automated tests at the hardware-in-the-loop test bed with modeling of various
faults and their combinations. In any case, to receive reliable statistical estimates one needs a
representative sample of rather large amount of data.
In the analysis of the Markov model, the relation of the transition probability matrix with
state of elements and subsystems at each level of hierarchy is considered. Therefore it is nec‐
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essary to have the model of the system behavior in various states with various flight condi‐
tion to guarantee system safety, reliable localization and accommodation of faults.
As the basic mathematical model of the controlled plant, the description in the state space is
considered in the form of stochastic difference equations:
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ),X t X t U t tx+ = + +A B F (1)
where X ∈R s is the s-dimensioned state vector; U ∈R s is the s-dimensioned control vector;
A, B and F are (n×n), (n×s) and (n×r) matrices accordingly; ξ∈R s is the vector of independ‐
ent random variables. Thus, the dynamic object described by this finite-difference equation,
with input coordinate (control variable) U and output coordinate (state variable) X, in the
closed scheme of the automatic control system is the controlled Markov process [12, 13].
The level of quantisation allows the Markov process to be converted into the Markov chain.
Provided ξ(t) is a stationary process, the Markov chain will be homogeneous. Such chain is
described by the means of the stochastic transition probability matrix P with the dimensions
(m×m), where m is the number of the chain states. Each element of the matrix Pij represents
the probability of the system transition from the condition Хi into the condition Xj during
the time interval ΔT:
Pij =Prob{X (t)= X i, X (t + 1)= X j}, ∀n∈N ,
_____
1
; ; 1, 1, .2 2
m
i i i ij
j
x xX x x P i m
=
é ùD DÎ - + = =ê úë û å (2)
Condition (2) means that the matrix P should be stochastic and define the full system of
events. The sum of elements in each row of the stochastic matrix should equal 1.
The size of the matrix P is defined by the prior information on the order of the object model
(1) and the number of the sampling intervals Δx and Δu. The transition probabilities are then
estimated as relative frequencies of the corresponding discrete events.
The statistical estimation of the transition probabilities for the controlled Markov chain is
performed as the calculation of the frequencies for the corresponding events during obser‐
vation and the subsequent calculation of the elements of matrix P using the formula:
1
ijk
ijk m
ijk
j
NP
N
=
=
å (3)
where the numerator Nijk is the number of the following events:{X (tn)= X i, X (tn+1)= X j, U (tn)=Uk }, and the denominator corresponds to the number of
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events such as{X (tn)= X i, U (tn)=Uk }. Thus, for any combination of state Xi and control Uk, a
full system of events will consist of the set of the state transitions Xj.
The normalisation of Equation (3) makes matrix P stochastic. As a result, the set of probabili‐
ties in each row Pij describes the full system of events for which the sum of probabilities is
equal to unit:
∑
j=1
m Pijk =1.
The estimation of a transition probability matrix of the Markov model consists of creation of
multidimensional histograms which represent an estimate of joint distribution [14, 15].
The use of the hierarchical Markov model allows to "compress" information which has been
recorded during one flight, and to present it in a more compact form. In this case, the possi‐
bility of analysis and forecast of dynamics of degradation degree (Figure 10) opens. It is pos‐
sible to analyze the state dynamics of elements and functions at each level of hierarchy in
time for decision-making support.
E
le
m
en
ts
Figure 10. Dynamics of state parameters during flight
The analysis of fault information and state change can be carried out over flight data for the
whole duration of maintenance and the whole "fleet" of engines and their systems (Figure
11). Such analysis will assist to increase efficiency for processes of experimental maintenance
development and monitoring system support.
Given statistics on all park of engines within several years, it is possible to build empirical
estimates of probabilities of the first and second type errors.
Thus, possibilities of application of hierarchical Markov models for the gas turbine and its
FADEC for compact representation of information on flight and for the assessment of "sensi‐
tivity" of the monitoring system according to actual data are considered. The levels of hier‐
archy differ with the ways of introducing redundancy and realization of system safety with
use of intellectual algorithms of control and diagnosis. Each higher level of hierarchy has
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greater "intelligence" and is designed independently in the assumption of ideal system sta‐
bility of the lower level.
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Figure 11. Hierarchical fuzzy Markov model of gas turbine states
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Consider an example. In Figure 12, the FADEC state estimation with faults is presented on
the basis of the degradation degree of the elements.
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Figure 12. Example of hierarchical estimation of state parameters
At the 10th level the BMS detected a fault of measurement in the form of break of the first
coil of parameter n11 (shaft speed sensor). On the basis of the fuzzy rule R(2), the parameters
of measurement state of n1 in the channel A are characterized by the following three values
μT 1(n11)=0, 2
μT 2(n11)=0, 7
μT 3(n11)=0, 1
.
R (2) : IF (n11 = A2 AND n12 = A1) THEN y =T2 ⇒
μT 1(n1)=0, 2; μT 2(n1)=0, 7; μT 3(n1)=0, 1 .
The measurement state in the channel B is defined as
μT 1(n12)=1
μT 2(n12)=0
μT 3(n12)=0
, because no faults were de‐
tected. At the 9th level, the sensor state of the n is obtained using the multiplication of the
vector of state parameters and faults influence indexes:
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(ID1)
The state of an element of a higher level is calculated by multiplication of the current state to
fault influence indexes of the fault elements. The state of both measurement channels of
temperature T is "operational", therefore, the sensor T state equals
S (T )o =1
S (T )d =0
S (T )f =0
 The sensor of
fuel feed α is also good working.
At the 8th level the state of two sensors n and T after similar calculations becomes equal
{ 0,78; 0,19; 0,03 } that indicated the system degradation in the part of control of fuel con‐
sumption.
For the estimation of a state of the fuel consumption control function, the "OR" operation is
also used. The state of the actuator of fuel consumption control circuit is characterized by
the parameters { 0,66; 0,34; 0 }. The state of FADEC is characterized by the fault of fuel con‐
sumption control function or the state of the guide vanes control function. Using the opera‐
tion "OR", the state of FADEC is detected as { 0,66; 0,34; 0 }. In this example, the whole
system is considered to be operational, whereas partial degradation is observed, which is
not influencing the system operability.
Thus, the technique of state parameters determination for FADEC and its systems on the ba‐
sis of fuzzy logic and Markov chains is proposed. This technique can be used during flight
or in maintenance on the ground.
At the present time a necessary condition for realization of intellectual algorithms is the
complete development of the distributed intellectual control models focused on control opti‐
mization, forecasting and system safety [16, 17]. In Figure 13, the scheme of the distributed
FADEC is shown.
Thus, in each sensor or actuator, it is necessary to have physically built-in control system (or
function) to form and monitor the fault signals in the unit, communication lines, cooperating
sensors, indication devices and systems [18]. The use of the built-in monitoring control sys‐
tems working in real time allows to obtain a number of additional possibilities for improv‐
ing control quality and system operational characteristics as followings:
• emergency states detection of the control object and system;
• fault detection of elements of the control object;
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• state diagnosis and parametrical degradation of the object.
FADEC SensorActuator
Sensor
Sensor
ActuatorControllerActuator
Sensor
Sensor
Functional unit
Tracking system 
Digital bus
Figure 13. Distributed architecture of FADEC
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, the hierarchical fuzzy Markov modeling of fault developments processes has
been proposed for the analysis of an airplane system safety. The hierarchical model integra‐
tes functional, physical structure of gas turbine and its FADEC elements and units, the tree
of states, a tree of fault influence indexes. This model allows to decompose the power-plant
for a quantitative estimates of degradation state and gradual faults. The analysis of hierar‐
chies allows to utilize the state model on the basis of fault development processes which es‐
timates the power-plant state at each level of hierarchy. Furthermore, the technique of
determination of state parameters of the gas turbine and its systems on the basis of fuzzy
logic is presented. The state of each element, unit and system is represented in the form of a
vector with parameters { operational, degradation, faults }. The use of the proposed indica‐
tor ”degradation degree” allows to obtain an objective quantitative estimate of the current
state which can be used as, the "distance" to a critical situation and the reserve of time for
decision-making in-flight. This indicator is defined on the basis of the discrete-ordered scale
and fault influence indexes that allows to determine about 30 % of gradual faults in gas tur‐
bine and its systems at the stage of fault development. The examples of fuzzy rules on the
basis of expert knowledge are given, whereas fuzzy logic is used for interpolation.
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The application of hierarchical Markov models for the analysis of experimental data is also
considered for control system development: as the compact representation of information of
a system state change during flight, the estimation of transition probabilities.
Nomenclature
FADEC – Full Authority Digital Engine Control.
BMS – built-in monitoring system.
ω – weighting coefficient of fault.
S – state (condition) of gas turbines.
μ – membership function.
P – probability.
X – state variable.
U – control variable.
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